The Ethics of Argument

Argument is everywhere. From the kitchen table to the boardroom to the highest echelons of power, we all use argument to persuade, investigate new ideas, and make collective decisions.

Unfortunately, we often fail to consider the ethics of arguing. This makes it perilously easy to mistreat others — a critical concern in personal relationships, workplace decision-making and political deliberation.

The norms of argument

Everyone understands there are basic norms we should follow when arguing. Logic and commonsense dictate that, when deliberating with others, we should be open to their views. We should listen carefully and try to understand their reasoning. And while we can’t all be Socrates, we should do our best to respond to their thoughts with clear, rational and relevant arguments.

Since the time of Plato, these norms have been defended on “epistemic” grounds. This means the norms are valuable because they promote knowledge, insight and self-understanding. What “critical thinking” is to internal thought processes, these “norms of argument” are to interpersonal discussion and deliberation.

Why ‘ethical’ arguing is important

In a recent article, I contend that these norms of argument are also morally important.

Sometimes this is obvious. For example, norms of argument can overlap with commonsense ethical principles, like honesty. Deliberately misrepresenting a person’s view is wrong because it involves knowingly saying something false.

More importantly, but less obviously, being reasonable and open-minded ensures we treat our partners in argument in a consensual and reciprocal way. During arguments, people open themselves up to attaining worthwhile benefits, like understanding and truth. If we don’t “play by the rules”, we can frustrate this pursuit.

Worse, if we change their minds by misleading or bamboozling them, this can amount to the serious wrongs of manipulation or intimidation.

Instead, obeying the norms of argument shows respect for our partners in argument as intelligent, rational individuals. It acknowledges they can change their minds based on reason. This matters because rationality is an important part of people’s humanity. Being “endowed with reason” is lauded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to support its fundamental claim that humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights.

Obeying the norms of argument also has good effects on our character. Staying open-minded and genuinely considering contrary views helps us learn more about our own beliefs. As philosopher John Stuart Mill observed, He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. This open-mindedness helps us combat the moral perils of bias and groupthink.

What’s more, the norms of argument aren’t just good for individuals, they are also good for groups. They allow conflicts and collective decisions to be approached in a respectful, inclusive way, rather than forcing an agreement or escalating the conflict.

Indeed, arguments can make collectives. Two arguers, over time, can collectively achieve a shared intellectual creation. As partners in argument, they define terms, acknowledge areas of shared agreement, and mutually explore each other’s reasons. They do something together.

All these moral stakes accord with our everyday experiences of arguing. Many of us have enjoyed the sense of respect when our views have been welcomed, heard and seriously considered. And all of us know what it feels like to have our ideas dismissed, misrepresented or caricatured.

Why we have trouble arguing calmly

Unfortunately, being logical, reasonable and open-minded is easier said than done. When we argue with others, their arguments will inevitably call into question our beliefs, values, experience and competence.

These challenges are not easy to face calmly, especially if the topic is one we care about. This is because we like to think of ourselves as effective and capable, rather than mistaken or misguided. We also care about our social standing and like to project confidence. And we might worry that acknowledging an opponent's valid points might betray our social identity, and let down our 'tribe'. 

In addition, we suffer from confirmation bias, so we actively avoid evidence that we are wrong.

Finally, we may have material stakes riding on the argument’s outcome. After all, one of the main reasons we engage in argument is to get our way. We want to convince others to do what we want and follow our lead.

All this means that when someone challenges our convictions, we are psychologically predisposed to hit back hard.

Worse still, our capacity to evaluate whether our opponents are obeying the norms of argument is poor. All the psychological processes mentioned above don’t just make it hard to argue calmly and reasonably. They also trick us into mistakenly thinking our opponents are being illogical, making us feel as if it’s them, and not us, who’s failing to argue properly.

How should we navigate the moral complexity of arguing?

Arguing morally isn’t easy, but here are five tips to help:

1. Avoid thinking that when someone starts up an argument, they are mounting an attack. To borrow Oscar Wilde, there is only one thing in the world worse than being argued with, and that is not being argued with. Reasoned argument acknowledges a person’s rationality, and that their opinion matters.
2. There is always more going on in any argument than who wins and who loses. In particular, the relationship between the two arguers can be at stake. Often, the real prize is demonstrating respect, even as we disagree.
3. Don’t be too quick to judge your opponent’s standards of argument. There’s a good chance you’ll succumb to “defensive reasoning”, where you’ll use all your intelligence to find fault with their views, instead of genuinely reflecting on what they are saying. Instead, try and work with them to clarify their reasoning.
4. Never assume that others aren’t open to intelligent argument. History is littered with examples of people genuinely changing their minds, even in the most high stakes environments imaginable.
5. It’s possible for both sides to “lose” an argument. The recently announced inquiry into question time in Australian Parliament provides a telling example. Even as the government and opposition strive to “win” during this daily show of political theatre, the net effect of their appalling standards is that everyone’s reputation suffers.

The upshot

There is a saying in applied ethics that the worst ethical decisions you’ll ever make are the ones you don’t recognise as ethical decisions.

So, when you find yourself in the thick of argument, do your best to remember what’s morally at stake.

Otherwise, there’s a risk you might lose a lot more than you win.

Notes

An earlier version of this article was published in The Conversation as: ‘Actually, it’s okay to disagree. Here are 5 ways we can argue better’. If readers are interested in following up the ideas here in greater detail, the hyperlink in the above piece goes to the article (‘The Ethics of Arguing’ Inquiry) homepage at Taylor & Francis Online. Unfortunately (for those without an academic institutional affiliation), the article itself is behind a paywall. However, this link will provide full access for the first fifty readers to use it. Please feel free to do so!

The threats and promises of multidimensional legitimacy

‘Multidimensional legitimacy’ is the idea that there are an array of distinct dimensions on which an institution (or instrument like a law or code) might gain or lose legitimacy. In my recent writings on the subject, I’ve focused on normative legitimacy. On this understanding, legitimacy refers to objective legitimacy—that is, the presence of specific qualities that provide subjects with good moral reasons to respect and support the institution. I’ve explored this topic in recent publications in The Oxford Journal of Legal Studies ((2018a), considering copyright law), Law and Philosophy ((2018b), considering human rights), and in The Journal of Business Ethics ((2019), considering institutional codes of ethics). But the idea of multidimensional legitimacy also has a descriptive inflection, where it refers to subjective legitimacy—that is, the presence of specific qualities that tend to encourage actual people to respect and support the institution.

Either way, the idea isn’t particularly new or particularly controversial. After all, many moral theories intrinsically capture multiple dimensions of legitimacy. For example, Locke’s influential social contract theory developed in his 1690 Second Treatise of Government initially focuses on natural rights and correlative duties (‘substantive’ legitimacy). Yet because the unilateral protection of these rights creates inevitable risks of coercive violence, Locke appealed to contractual devices (employing ‘rule of law’, ‘fairness’ and ‘consent’ legitimacy), and went on to recommend democratic and deliberative legislative bodies (implicating ‘process’ and ‘decision-making’ legitimacy).

Multidimensional legitimacy is also well-known from a sociological perspective. A famous example is Max Weber’s tripartite position on state legitimacy, considering rational, traditional and charismatic legitimacy.

Yet even if the idea of multidimensional legitimacy is not new, many intriguing questions remain about what dimensions should be included in any multidimensional legitimacy framework, which elements are reducible to one of the others, and how trade-offs and compromises can be appropriately managed.

By way of quick illustration, my current (though still evolving) view includes ten distinct dimensions of legitimacy:

1. It works: Functional legitimacy.
2. It’s right: Substantive legitimacy.
3. It’s reasonable: Fairness legitimacy.
4. It’s predictable and followable: Rule of law legitimacy.
5. It’s ours: Communitarian legitimacy.
6. It respects us: Autonomy legitimacy.
7. I agreed: Consent legitimacy.
8. I trust: Transmission legitimacy.
9. We debated: Process legitimacy.
10. We decided: Decision-making legitimacy.

In my work, I’ve generally focused on the positives created by multidimensional legitimacy. For the ability of people to develop several distinct lines of legitimacy for their institutions or laws has real value. Perhaps most importantly, it allows us to create scope for agreement when initially agreement seems hard to come by. Even if we disagree on the substance of the collective action we should perform, perhaps we can come to agree on the process by which the decision will be made, on key features that any solution will have to include, or on certain outcomes that we should ensure. Through such mechanisms, we can develop widespread support that previously seemed impossible. This support can be important intrinsically, when it creates the conditions for consent to collective actions or rules, when it deescalates conflicts, or when it allows participants to show mutual moral respect to others, even as they disagree. And it is important instrumentally, as it increases the efficacy of social institutions and systems of rules through improved compliance and buy-in. In so doing, the effective pursuit of multidimensional legitimacy can create wide assent even in the face of a strong diversity of substantive views. If we think that diversity is generally a good thing, morally and epistemically, then multidimensional legitimacy helps us manage and maintain that diversity.

Yet I want to briefly raise here the worry that there is a darker side to multidimensional legitimacy. For there are ways that having multiple distinct routes to legitimacy can create less desirable outcomes.

One concern is that we might become too perfectionist about legitimacy, aiming for full legitimacy on each dimension. This pursuit might be distracting, costly and time-consuming. But it might also foment unnecessary controversy. Cass Sunstein (1996) rightly lauds what he calls ‘incompletely theorised agreements’—where shared agreement on a way forward should not be threatened by the desire to ensure unanimity on the reasons why that way forward is ultimately justified. Indeed, the tendency to appeal to various forms of legitimacy may even escalate conflicts, by allowing new grievances to be brought into a dispute, frustrating resolution of the original issue (Glasl, 1999).

The pursuit of multidimensional perfection might also raise the standards for legitimacy beyond what is actually feasible by fallible humans and their institutions. Ten sources of legitimacy means ten potential lines of critique—and it will be a rare alignment of the planets when an institution is immune from critique on any dimension. If our moral standards are too demanding, then the best may become the enemy of the good.

But perhaps the main worry I have with multidimensional legitimacy is that it can work to entrench already polarised political views. Multidimensional legitimacy empowers the capacity of cooperative agents who want to find a way forward together despite their deep disagreements. But it also empowers the capacity for those who want to resist a collective way forward by allowing them to find new reasons to disagree. For when there is disagreement on the substance of what law or policy we should have, commentators and leaders can be tempted to reach for alternative sources of legitimacy not as a way of securing more widespread assent, but instead as a means of selecting lines of argument that further cement their position.

Consider, for example, controversies about the rightful strength and scope of international law and governance (see Bodansky (1999) for an earlier like-minded treatment). Those sceptical about international law can appeal to communitarian legitimacy (‘It’s not our way of doing things.’), transmission legitimacy (‘It comes from a source captured by international elites.’), process legitimacy (‘Most citizens don’t even know how international law is formed.’) and decision-making legitimacy (‘We didn’t vote for it.’)

Meanwhile, those sympathetic to international law will stress functional legitimacy (‘This is critically necessary to deal with urgent and potentially catastrophic global problems.’), rule of law legitimacy (‘We need to protect against might-makes-right arbitrary power in international affairs.’), substantive legitimacy (‘It’s the morally right thing to do.) and fairness legitimacy (‘It appropriately shares the burdens and goods of collective endeavours and resources.’)

These different lines of argument may all be valid on their own terms, and worthy of serious consideration. After all, that is the very point of multidimensional legitimacy—the awareness that there are different and irreducible qualities that provide genuine moral reasons for or against an institution, policy or law. But with the current state of political deliberation, commentators and leaders can be tempted to exclusively focus on the sources of legitimacy that support their view. If a commentator is, for example, against the Paris Climate Agreement, then the lines of argument noted above give them an enormous amount to validly critique—so much, indeed, that they might never get around to explicitly confronting whether they agree that harmful climate change is likely and—if so—what should be done about it. By adopting and focusing explicitly and repeatedly on certain legitimacy dimensions, to the exclusion of all others, each side can create echo-chambers of partisan agreement.

Ultimately, the ability to appeal to multiple routes to legitimacy empowers groups that possess internal disagreements, but share a commitment to cooperation and equal respect, to find ways forward that everyone can potentially respect and support. Unfortunately, there are also darker sides to multidimensional legitimacy, and we will sometimes need to be aware of the worrying ways it may contribute to conflict escalation or group polarisation effects.

References

Bodansky, Daniel. 1999. “The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?” American Journal of International Law 93, no. 3: 596-624.

Breakey, Hugh. 2018a. “Deliberate, Principled, Self-Interested Law Breaking: The Ethics of Digital ‘Piracy’.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 3, no. 4: 676-705.

Breakey, Hugh. 2018b. “It’s Right, It Fits, We Debated, We Decided, I Agree, It’s Ours, and It Works: The Gathering Confluence of Human Rights Legitimacy.” Law and Philosophy 37, no. 1: 1-28.

Breakey, Hugh. 2019. “Harnessing Multi-Dimensional Legitimacy for Codes of Ethics: A Staged Approach.” Journal of Business Ethics Forthcoming.

Glasl, Friedrich. 1999. Confronting Conflict. Gloucestershire: Hawthorn.

Sunstein, Cass R. 1996. Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press.