Sunday, September 30, 2012

Zombie Apocalypses, Lasertag and Ethics


But does she count as a person for the purposes of
applying Kant's Categorical Imperative?
How would people behave in the world of a zombie apocalypse, and what, if anything, does it tell us about ordinary morality?

One theory is that we would all fall upon each other, tearing ourselves to pieces in a ‘Lord of the Flies’ type frenzy. Life in the zombie aftermath would be – in the words the Seventeenth Century political theorist Thomas Hobbes used to describe the ‘State of Nature’ – ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. And this is so not because of the dangers from zombies, but rather because of the dangers presented by other humans in a lawless world.

Is this really what would happen?

A recent post on The Conversation suggests – in a light-hearted fashion – that there is some evidence that it is. The author describes the player-to-player carnage of the videogame DayZ, where players struggle to survive in a post-Zombie-apocalyptic world. The costs and payoffs to players in the game are structured so that rational self-interested players benefit greatly from killing others and stealing their stuff. And that, for the most part, is exactly what the players do. Of course, some stalwart do-gooders can be found – healers of the wasteland – but they are all the more remarkable because of the cutthroat and solitary world they inhabit.

Better hope that Z-Plan is tight.

But it seems to me that all this shows is how warped the DayZ game-mechanics must be. A game that has people avoiding teaming up for survival is unrealistic. (Just to clarify that – a zombie apocalypse is of course altogether realistic. But a world where survival is not improved by being in at least small teams, preferably with cordial relations with other nearby teams, is utterly divorced from the irremovable realities of the human situation.) Some level of decency, trustworthiness and sociability is a core part of rational survival.

Now if we were to take the less fun path, this point could be argued through the theories of the great philosophers since Epicurus in the Greek Hellenistic period, and we could use the philosophies of Rousseau and Hume to refute the grim picture relayed by Hobbes. Similarly, we could make the point in terms of contemporary game theory, arguing that the dog-eat-dog ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ model of human interaction is a misrepresentation of ordinary reality, and that the more sociable ‘stag hunt’ game is a better picture of what is going on.

Instead though, I propose to take the fun path, and to compare the DayZ situation that which arises in zombie lasertag.

Stuck for a gift idea for the person who has it all?
Go with zombie apocalypse erotic romance!
But before we turn to violence; sex.

After all, the normal social motivations that pull people together will be just as relevant post-apocalypse. Indeed, this very day marks the book release of what I suspect is the first ever novel-length erotic romance set in a zombified world: Flesh by Kylie Scott.(No, the zombies themselves aren’t getting it on, so get that mental image out of your heads. Ew. No. It’s about a ménage forming amongst three survivors as they band together against the infected hordes.) And the idea here is a pretty plausible one. People are still going to have the same desires for companionship, love and lust in the new world. Probably more. Heck, you may as well live like there’s no tomorrow when there’s every chance there really is no tomorrow. Indeed, a considerable number of writers have written on this premise; it turns out there is in fact a website for the Romance Writers of the Apocalypse.

And there is a deeper point at issue here. There are basic survival gains in simply having a good time. This is the major problem I have with the TV series The Walking Dead. There’s a point at which grimness becomes pathological. Every character in that show seems just a nudge away from committing suicide. Lighten up people! In order to survive, you need to want to survive. You need something to get you through the day – and that might well be whatever gets you through the night. Ultimately, one of the best survival rules offered in Zombieland is not Rule #1 ‘cardio’, or Rule #2 ‘Double-Tap’, but rather Rule #32: ‘Enjoy the little things’. 

Or, in the case of Flesh, the not-so-little things. And all at the same time. Stag-hunt games indeed.

But to return from sex and zombie erotica to violence and zombie lasertag, last week I was fortunate enough to play in a test-run of the new Laserforce Zombie game.

For those who don’t know much about lasertag, the basic principle is pretty simple. You wear a vest-pack with flashing lights and sensors on it, and it attaches to a gun that shoots a laser. When your shot hits the sensors on the vest-pack of an enemy player, their suit registers that it has been hit, and it ‘goes down’ for a period of time – meaning that their lights go out and their gun won’t work. They can still be shot again, so usually they will have to run away and hide somewhere until their suit reactivates and they can start shooting people again. A central computer keeps track of everyone’s score – basically the amount of times they have shot the enemy and been shot by the enemy.
Social Science Experiments: Lasertag vs. DayZ

That’s the simple story. But most games of lasertag – such as the one I play at Laserforce league – are more complicated. A lot more complicated. In ‘Space Marines 5’ (the game that the international competition is held in) you have limited lives and shots and need to get resupplied by team-members – your ‘Ammo’ and ‘Medic’ – in order to stay in the game and keep fighting. Plus there are nukes, rapid-fire, missiles, ‘generator targets’, power-boosts and more. The goal in that game isn’t merely to outscore your opponents, but to eliminate their team altogether. Kill their medic out of the game, and then remove the other players one by one.

On the last League night, league players were used as the test subjects for Laserforce’s new Zombie game. The game is pretty much how you’d imagine it. Everyone but one player starts as a human ‘survivor’, with flashing red lights on their vest. One player starts as a zombie. The zombie (with flashing green lights) wants to infect the survivors, which it can do by shooting them with a ‘missile’. Using a missile is just like shooting them normally, but it takes a little longer. You have to ‘lock on’ to them with your gun pointed at their vest-sensors, which takes a little over a second. The zombie is also hard to kill. He has to be shot multiple times before he goes down, and it doesn’t take him long to get back up again. Once a survivor is infected, they have 30 seconds to get the ‘cure’, which pops up periodically at one of the in-game targets. If you can’t get the cure in time (and you can only ever use one cure per game), then the infection takes hold. Your lights turn green and you turn on your buddies, trying to infect them.

The game is an ‘individual’ game. That is, the score and player rankings are not built around team victory, but solely on individual performance. Your aim is to win personally, not to play a part in getting your team to victory.

So how did the survivors act in this situation, in order to maximise their own individual score?

Exactly how you would imagine. They teamed up.

Of course they teamed up. It took barely seconds for players to realise that there was safety in numbers. To be found on your own was to be infected. You needed players around you to communicate where the zombies are, to check in every direction the zombies might attack your position, and to create enough firepower to shoot the zombie down before he could infect anyone in your group. As well, the less zombies that were out there on the playfield, the more manageable the task was. Keeping track of and defending against one or two zombies was straightforward. But once you have five or six zombies, coming at you en masse and from different directions, the end is nigh.

In fact, so successful was the teaming up and communication amongst the dozen or so survivors that in the first test game the starting zombie wasn’t even able to infect anyone. Spreading out across the upstairs levels, players gravitated towards vantage points that allowed each group to patrol and defend one of the four routes the zombie could take to get upstairs. Equally, being upstairs allowed each group to keep track of an area of the lower playfield; with good communication every player on the field knew exactly where the zombie was at pretty much every moment of the game.

This might have happened in the second game as well, if some morons hadn’t ruined the important social science experiment by deliberately allowing themselves to be infected just so they could stagger about the playfield, infecting survivors and mumbling, ‘Brains, brains’. (I totally deny any involvement in such silliness.)

There was even enlightened self-sacrifice when it came to the cure. After some frenetic in-game arguments, some players were willing to forego getting the cure themselves, in order to let infected players use it. Better to not have the resource yourself than to have an ally turn into an enemy, and to let the zombies get a foothold in the survivor population.

The point is that a basic level of teamwork is a fundamental part of any real-world scenario. Human beings are in many respects, if not a pack animal, then at least a social animal. Throughout history they survive, or perish, in groups. They cannot see every direction at once. They need time to sleep, recuperate and reload. Their capacity to fight off threats increases in their greater numbers. And their natural specializations can lead to a useful division of labour in groups.  In a word, society pays off.

Thus I conclude that the zombie lasertag social science experiment supports the view that some level of moral behaviour – trust, teamwork and so on – arises amongst self-interested rational actors.

What is the result here for moral theory? Well, some might say that morality is entirely divorced from self-interested rational behaviour. Prudence has nothing to do with genuine respect for others. Others might say morality just is enlightened self-interested rational behaviour. The truth, though, is perhaps somewhere in between, and that the sociable teamwork required by the human condition – both in ordinary life and during zombie apocalypses – sets us on a path to morality proper.

A final observation. One interesting facet of the zombie evening was the question of rules. All the players on the night were Laserforce league players – and the League requires players abide by various rules, such as not chasing fleeing opponents with their lights out and not ‘blind-shooting’ opponents (sticking your gun around corners without looking and shooting). These rules are standardly applied in non-league games as well; while there are no referees in these games, others will chastise you (that is, they will abuse the heck out of you) if you clearly breach these rules. But no-one expected the zombie to follow the rules. Of course zombies chase their prey. The rules cannot apply to them. The ease with which everyone instinctually accepted this departure from the rules that accompany every other game was fascinating.

But then the further question arose as to whether the survivors should be rule-bound to the zombies. How could it be wrong to cheat against the undead, by blindshooting them for instance? They weren’t human; they weren’t really persons anymore.

Rational self-interest may lead us on the path to morality proper. But even morality proper has its limits – and they seem to stop about the time you dig yourself out of that shallow grave and start feasting on people’s brains.

There will be morality amongst humans in the post-apocalyptic world – but it probably won’t extend to the post-human. Sorry.

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

Australia in the UN Security Council: Non-cynical reflections

Security Council meeting on Afghanistan, Sept 2012, UN Photos/Eskinder Debebe

On October 18, in the 67th session of the UN General Assembly, the United Nations will vote on whether Australia will take up one of the non-permanent seats on offer over 2013-14 at the United Nations Security Council. Australia is in (somewhat oddly, somewhat sensibly) the ‘Western European and Others Group’, which has two seats available in this vote. Australia will be vying against Finland and Luxembourg.

It is easy to be a little cynical about Australia’s bid, and its potential significance. The first thing I asked myself, when I heard of the bid, was whether I thought there was any major issue where Australia’s vote would realistically diverge from that of the United States (and, relatedly, that of the United Kingdom). If Australia was to be no more than a ‘yes-man’ to the US, who already hold veto-power in the Council, then it was hard to understand what real contribution it would make to the Security Council decision-making. And I doubted whether Australia would in fact vote against the US position on any major matters of international security – for much the same reasons as Australia played a role in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. At least when it comes to issues of national and international security, Australia takes its relationship to the US very seriously.

But, on reflection, I think this was the wrong question to ask. I think the important question is this: 

Would Australia be willing and able to impact on the wording of UN resolutions that are proposed by the Western bloc (US, UK, France)? 

And I think the answer to this question is ‘yes’.

The first thing to note is that the specific wording of UN Security Council resolutions is incredibly important – perhaps moreso now than ever before. A matter of word-selection can make the difference between a military action being legal under international law or not (as has occurred in the context of the recent Iraq war, where arguments either way depend on the briefest sentences in two or three resolutions). Resolution minutiae can make the difference between vital action occurring or not occurring.  Action by the peacekeeping force in Rwanda in 1994 was stymied, in part at least, because the operation there was directed to contribute to the security and protection of civilians, rather than to provide security or protect civilians. The difference in wording can seem tiny – but the ramifications can be huge.

What would Australia have to offer, in this respect? Both because it is a ‘middle power’, and because of its actual location on the globe, Australia can have more reason to avoid striking a belligerent tone on matters of international security than the US or UK. Its middle power status makes it more sensitive of the need to compromise, and for the need for sensitivity for the concerns of other nations and peoples. It is these traits – which I think are evinced particularly in the role Australia has played in international peacekeeping for some time – that can make it a valuable contributor to the Council.

Moreover, Australia has very different neighbours to most of the other Western bloc countries. In a way, Australia’s inclusion on the Security Council effectively gets another representative for the Asia-Pacific area onto the Council. As well as helping bring to international attention various issues that are relevant to the region, it seems to me there is good reason to believe that Australia will try to nuance its behaviour on the Security Council in a manner that enhances, rather than detracts, from its relations with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and so on.

Ultimately, Australia is in an almost unique position (alongside New Zealand) in terms of its politics and positioning on the globe. While it unquestionably shares its fundamental values with the West, its dialogue and relations with its neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region make it sensitive to concerns that are less likely to be felt by Western European nations. And because of the structure of the voting in the Security Council, members that inject a spirit of compromise into resolutions can mean the difference between Council paralysis and action.

The question, then, is not whether or not Australia would take a stand against the US or UK on any important proposed resolution, but whether it would impact on the text of resolutions in a productive and sensitive manner.

I think the answer to that question could be ‘yes’.

Friday, September 21, 2012

Ministry of Radical Philosophy (not Silly Walks) Sketch


 (A man dressed in suit complete with bowler hat comes into shop. He is holding a cat with his arms outstretched, with the cat facing him.)

Minister: ‘Times’ please.

Shopkeeper: Oh yes sir, here you are.

Minister: Thank you.

Shopkeeper: Cheers.

(The Minister takes the paper with some difficulty, keeping the cat in position. He leaves the shop, and walks off. Cut to him proceeding along Whitehall, and into a building labeled ‘Ministry of Radical Philosophy’. For a moment the cat looks away, and the Minister freezes in place. Then the cat returns to looking at him, and he continues on. Inside the building he passes three other people, each behaving in indescribably strange ways. Cut to an office; a man is sitting waiting. The minister enters, still holding his cat.)

Minister: Good morning. I'm sorry to have kept you waiting, but I'm afraid my philosophy has become rather more radical recently and so it takes me rather longer to get to work. (Places cat on table facing him. Leans forward conspiratorially) Vicarious solipsism. I argue my cat, Snowball, is the only fully existing entity in the universe. The rest of us only exist when she is observing us. (Leans back in chair.) Now then, what was it again?

Mr Pudey: Well sir, I have a radical philosophy and I'd like to obtain a Government grant to help me develop it.

Minister: I see. (Keeping one eye on the cat.) May I hear your radical philosophy?

Mr Pudey: Yes, certainly, yes. Here it is. (Pudey stands) Ahem. First Premise: In our society, we believe in certain moral rules – like respecting human rights. Second Premise: In other societies, they believe in different moral rules. For instance they may not believe in human rights. The conclusion is –

Minister: (Sees the cat about to get distracted by licking itself.) Wait! (The cat licks its privates for a moment, and the Minister freezes in place. It then looks up again.) Right, continue.

Mr Pudey: Right. So – first premise, we have certain moral rules. Second premise, other cultures have different moral rules. Conclusion: (he pauses triumphantly) Other societies are wrong. (Pause. Minister waits cautiously.) Wrong in their moral beliefs.

Minister: That’s it, is it?

Mr Pudey: Yes, that’s it, yes.

Minister: It’s not particularly radical, is it? I mean, the premises aren’t radical at all, and the logic merely performs a low-level reification and a standard is-ought fallacy.

Mr Pudey: Yes, but I think that with Government backing I could make it very radical.

Minister: (rising) Mr Pudey,  the very real problem is one of money. I’m afraid that the Ministry of Radical Philosophy is no longer getting the kind of support it needs. You see there's Defence, Social Security, Health, Housing, Education, Radical Philosophy ... they’re all supposed to get the same. But last year, the Government spent less on the Ministry of Radical Philosophy than it did on National Defence! Now we get $348,000,000 a year, which is supposed to be spent on all our available research projects. (he sits down) Coffee?

Mr Pudey: Yes please.

Minister: (pressing intercom) Ms Wendt, would you bring us in two coffees please?

Intercom Voice: You bastard.

Minister: ... (Smiles indulgently) Now the Japanese have a man who believes in panpsychism and psychological behaviourism at one and the same time; everything both has and has not got mental states. While the Israelis, at least, whenever Snowball is paying attention to them, the Israelis have – Ah, here is the coffee.  (Enter secretary with tray with two cups on it. Puts it down on table.) Thank you for getting that. (Secretary slaps him hard. Minister smiles understandingly. She leaves. Minister leans forward to explain.) PhD Candidate. Radical ethical philosophy of language, you know. Any use of verbs counts as patriarchal marginalization. Promising stuff. (Leans back) You’re really interested in radical philosophy, aren’t you?

Mr Pudey: Oh rather. Yes.

Minister: Well, I’ve told you about the Japanese. The Israelis have a girl who argues the Pythagorean commandment not to touch a white cock follows necessarily from his mathematical theorem. Could neuter entire mathematics departments. For their part, on the continent there’s a fellow who shows beyond dispute that computer viruses must be accorded basic moral considerability and constitutional rights. (Frowns and looks at computer.) Still haven’t received that email from him. And the Russians – well! (Leans forward and whispers.) Don’t spread this one around. Very hush-hush. But the Russians have a thinktank who – building ambitiously on Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism – are daring to question the metaphysical reality of government funded research grants!

Mr Pudey: Oh my God! (Falls off chair in shock.)

Friday, September 14, 2012

“Since you’re a philosopher you must know…” (#4 on the list of top ten things not to say to a philosopher)


So this is basically a gripe.
Read Pufendorf? Wtf? I haven't even read the contents of my own bookshelf!

There are a lot of things I like about being a philosopher. One of the things I like is that when people ask what I do I can tell them I’m a philosopher. Because of the type of places I like to hang out, this often results in them asking me what a philosopher is, which usually means we wind up talking about philosophy. This, for me, is a pretty happy result.

But sometimes it doesn’t work like that.

Sometimes, the person does know what philosophy is. In fact, they have read some, or heard of some somewhere. And finally, they have met a real, live philosopher to talk to about it.

Which is great!

Except when they say:

“Since you’re a philosopher, you must know and have read such-and-such…”

And then, when you tell them you haven’t read it, and maybe don’t even know much about it, their face falls in disappointment. How can you – a professional philosopher – not have read the one piece of philosophy that they have read? It’s like meeting a scientist who says no, she’s never actually encountered the third law of thermodynamics before, but she’s really interested in hearing about it from you. Wtf?

Often, it isn’t even laypeople who do this. In its most prevalent form, it comes from other academics and intellectuals. You stumble into a law seminar and they figure you’ve spent years studying Marx, or at least Macpherson on Locke. You visit the social sciences and they’re pleased they have someone to explain Foucault to them. You flee to the hard sciences, where it is inconceivable you haven’t read Popper and Kuhn.

The basic problem, I take it, is that non-philosophers simply have no idea how vast philosophy really is.

Let me give an example. A few years ago I had the pleasure of teaching on one of my favourite subjects; the nature of moral values, relayed through its history since the Greeks. I agonized over what to put in and what to leave out, and wound up picking a selection of the usual suspects: Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Epictetus and the Stoics, Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Mill, Nietzsche and G. E. Moore. No real surprises there.

But let’s canvas (as we did briefly in the first lecture) who’s not featuring. The dramatis personae of those who didn’t make the cut is arresting. Most of the major political philosophers have been ignored, including those who had an enormous amount to say about moral values. The inclusions don’t even make space for the philosopher who often heads polls of the public’s view of the greatest and most influential philosopher of all time: Karl Marx. Nor does it include his immensely influential predecessor Hegel. The philosophers who most shaped the political landscape around us are missing: Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. The philosopher who perhaps alongside Nietzsche gave us the single most sophisticated study of the moral psychology doesn’t get a mention: Adam Smith (yes, he actually did write another book as well as the “Wealth of Nations”). With the exception of Mill there are no card-carrying feminists – worse still there are no women at all (unless Harriet Taylor really wrote as much of “On Liberty” as Mill said she did); no Wollstonecraft, de Beauvoir,  Irigaray… There is no-one at all from the Germany or France in the last century, despite the litany of famous authors from there – Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida, Foucault… No environmental philosophers – Naess, Leopold.

And we are hardly getting started. Thomas Aquinas is the only exemplary religious philosopher included, despite the wealth of input from the Christian, Jewish and Islamic scholars on the Western tradition of ethics. Where’s St Augustine, at least? Which is another way of observing that the list of inclusions only portrays the most facile patina of historical coverage. After all, there is almost a fifteen-hundred year gap in the middle of the list (did you spot it? Between the Stoics and Aquinas). Are we really to believe that nothing worth inclusion happened throughout that vast span of time, as empires rose and fell, religious traditions clashed and laws developed and dissolved? And don’t even get started on the anglo-centricity problem. Surely the Confucian tradition, at least, warrants mention. And what about the input of non-philosophers? Ever heard of that Charles Darwin fellow? He had a bit to say on the nature of morals. And the sociologists – Weber, Durkheim? And the psychologists and psychoanalysts – Freud, Piaget, Kohlberg, Gilligan? Not worth a mention?

One could go on.

And on.

The point is this: the history and content of moral philosophy – itself just one section of philosophy– is enormous. It is possible to reasonably demand a justification for the exclusion of every given one of these philosophers named above. But that’s just the point. Every one of those philosophers, and many more, warranted coverage in a course of this sort. But, it hardly needs to be said, the course only had so many lecture-slots, and harsh decisions had to be made.

Hegel? Cut.

Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Smith? Cut.

Anyone French? Cut.

Anyone writing in the last hundred years? Cut.

The rest of you name-brand guys are in.

Oh, except you Marx. You’re cut. No, I don’t care what that bloody poll said.

And just as there are only so many lectures in a course, so too there are only so many hours in a day, and only so many books that can be read. Most decent philosophers take months if not years of study to understand, and philosophers, like everyone else, need to specialize. So the chances are ultimately pretty high that if a layperson or an academic from another field has just bumped into a particular philosopher’s book, or just knows the philosophy that relates to their own domain, that I simply haven’t read it. Sometimes I won’t even have heard of it. And I doubt the problem is confined to me; most philosophers would encounter this (though maybe they don’t worry about it as much as I do).

What’s the cause of this problem? Is it simply that those who bump into some philosophy just assume that – if they as a non-philosopher have encountered it – then surely it must be a central text within philosophy itself? Is it a type of optimism they have that what they read actually mattered, and that the time spent wading through that forty pages of ethical argument at the end of ‘Atlas Shrugged’ was worth it? (Gracious – I didn’t even mention non-academic philosophers above!)

Or is the problem with we philosophers? Is it a function of the fact that philosophy never wholly dispenses with its past? Philosophy snowballs through history, gathering accretions but only rarely shedding them, to the point now where a person conversant with the works of every name mentioned above appears more like a polymath than a recognizable philosopher. Granted, there are occasionally efforts to excise vast parts of that history, and so to make philosophy more manageable. Analytic philosophy in the early 20th Century – under the spell of logical positivism – tried something like this with all those “unscientific” forebears. So too postmodern theory is all-too-easy to be taken as an excuse for not bothering with all those superseded dead, white males from modernist days of yore. I wonder what a tremendous intellectual relief it must be to have some excuse for ignoring all these thousands of years of philosophical thought. But – in the end – we keep going back for more. One generation casts aside Kant, and the next resurrects him. The struggle between Plato and Aristotle begins anew. And the snowball ever grows.

Perhaps the problem is with the way we philosophers write our books. When a layperson or non-philosophy-academic picks up one of our books, it’s unlikely they’ll be bearing in mind that this is just the latest offering on a question millennia old, on which countless theorists have written and are still writing. On which countless wrong turns have been taken and dead-ends found. The reader has happened across just one tiny drop in the ocean of thought, just one skittering pebble in the vast avalanche that is philosophy. Hopefully, of course, the drop might turn out to be an important one, the skittering pebble might be one that ramifies into a new avalanche – but such questions might not be settled for decades or even centuries after publication. In all likelihood, the drop will remain a drop, the pebble just a pebble.

Try putting that as the cover blurb on your new book.

Goodness knows I haven’t. So perhaps ultimately the fault is – at least in part – one of my own making. Perhaps philosophers have a tendency to present to their readers a view of philosophy as so much smaller than it actually is, so as to make our own works comparatively so much larger – and therefore worth reading and thinking about.

So – even though it didn’t make it onto the back cover of my upcoming book – this humble blogpost can be my attempt to communicate to the wider world the point that philosophy is big. Really big. And that the chances are pretty high that I have never heard of that dusty old tome you happened across in that delightful used bookstore.

But I’m happy to hear about it anyway.

Tuesday, September 4, 2012

Publishing, rejection and peer review in philosophy


“Peer review is the worst form of appraising academic work, except all the others that have been tried from time to time.”

Today I want to offer just a couple of reflections on peer review and publication, in the context of philosophy and the humanities. Hopeful they will be of some help or comfort to those just setting out on the tumultuous journey that is academic publication, or – like myself – still wrestling with its slings and arrows.

The first thing to keep in mind – as my bastardization on Churchill’s line on democracy above is meant to capture – is that peer review is by no means a perfect system. To be sure, it has substantial merits. What better way to judge academic work than to send it to experts in the field? Stripped of the name of its author, the experts judge it only by the cogency of its argument, the originality of the thinking, and the plausibility of its premises. The experts make their determination – hopefully offering thoughts for improvement – and the good papers are published and the poor ones passed over (usually to be reworked and submitted elsewhere). For the most part, the system works and is resilient enough to the occasional less-than-ideal behaviour on the part of individuals within it.

Indeed, one can feel a real dignity and virtue in the system when it works well. Reviewers and editors routinely decide to publish papers with whose conclusions they profoundly disagree; but they nevertheless accept the significance and the cogency of the argument and decide it is worth publishing on that basis. So too, the anonymity of the process really can create an equal playing field. Papers written by professors from Ivy League universities are passed over, and articles penned by PhD students from some backwater are selected. I may not have been to Cambridge, but I can (and have) published in its journal of ethics.

So that’s the good news. Of course it doesn’t always work like that. Sometimes, journal editors will reject papers immediately, before sending them out for review. And in such cases usually they will know the name(s) of the author, meaning the process is no longer blinded (processes can be put in place to fix this, of course). I hazard in such cases editors are more likely to give the benefit of the doubt to well-known professors than unknown students. There is no reason to believe editors are more judicious than reviewers in this respect, so it's hard to see why they shouldn't be blinded.

So too, reviewers can be biased. They can evaluate the argument on the basis of whether they approve of its conclusions, or not. Now I think this is often not as large a problem as it might seem, as there are institutional factors that press against it. Effectively, philosophers like (need!) to argue with each other, and to do that requires finding intelligent people who disagree with them. So a good argument against their favourite theory is not something they want to suppress – but rather to publish and then respond to. But bias can rear its head at certain points – both the Sokal hoax and the ‘climategate’ scandal carried the charge that reviewers in those cases focused on whether they agreed with the conclusion, rather than the cogency of the evidence and argument itself.

But the major problem with peer-review is simply this: journal referees are often time-poor, and there are few institutional reward-mechanisms to ensure they carry out their task diligently and judiciously. If a referee makes a laughably wrong decision in rejecting a paper (and the world is littered with stories of what-came-to-be landmark (even Nobel-prize winning) articles that were passed over with brusque rejections) then there is usually no professional fallout from their doing so. Indeed, the institution that employs them will almost never know what happened. This means that every time a referee gives a fair and careful appraisal of a manuscript it is almost always an act of virtue. They did it because they themselves wanted to do the task well, not because there was a system of accountability by which they might be judged and found wanting.

Even if there are no issues of bias or brusqueness, it still remains a grim fact that top journals have (and must have in order to function) very high rejection rates – often well above 90%. This means that reviewers need to be pretty critical; it’s not enough for them to think the manuscript is okay. To be successful the manuscript has to convince two separate referees (and often the editor as well) that this paper simply cannot be passed over; it is brilliant and a perfect fit for the journal. Unless you are a scintillating genius, this means that if you are submitting manuscripts to top journals, you will get rejections.

If you are anything like me, you will get a lot of rejections.

So how to survive, in this world?

The first thing is, of course, not to take rejections too seriously. If you’re in this game, you will get rejections. You will get lots of them. The mere fact that you have had a long series of rejections on a particular manuscript does not mean that the paper is not worthwhile. I have met colleagues who are surprised when I tell them one of my manuscripts has been rejected seven times and I am still revising it and sending it out. (This is not merely my own personal stubbornness; one of the smartest and most well-published early-career philosophers I know told me just the other day that she had hit seven rejections with a manuscript and was still sending it out.) To be sure, in some cases it may be that the paper just isn’t good enough – if all the reviewers tend to be saying the same thing, then changes are in order, at least. But you can just be unlucky. If you believe in the paper and its significance, then you need to stick with it. All of my best publications were rejected at least once by some journal or other. My favourite paper, and the one I feel to be my best contribution to political theory – Two Concepts of Property (The Philosophical Forum, 2011) – had no less than six rejections at various venues before it was accepted. (Though, to be fair to the reviewers that had rejected it, it was heavily revised as it went along, especially in the light of some sympathetic but trenchant critiques put forward by two excellent referees from Social Theory and Practice.)

The point is more general. Just as rejections can make you doubt a paper, they can make you doubt yourself. I think it is fair to say that I have a pretty robust self-belief about my capacities as a philosopher. But when you are hit, again and again, with rejections from multiple sources, about multiple papers, it is easy to start thinking you are getting things wrong in some deep way. But the fact is that if the journals you are submitting to only publish about one in twenty submissions they receive, then even if you are producing high-quality work, multiple rejections will be the order of the day.

With this in mind, it is important to keep in mind that – in publishing like in so many other pursuits – when you are doing well you will tend to chalk it up to your merits, and when you are doing poorly you will put it down to luck. We attribute successes to things in our control, and failures to things outside our control. This is just a part of how human beings think, but it can be a persistent bias. If you (or one of your peers) gets a string of acceptances, then you/they are probably doing a lot right. But you/they are probably also lucky. Around 2009, during my PhD, I received three journal acceptances in a short period of time. Frankly, at that point I thought journal publication was the easiest thing in the world, and that referees were clearly able to recognize manifest genius (i.e. me) when they saw it. Sometime in 2011, I began to realise how wrong I had been. The manuscripts had been good, yes, but I had been lucky as well. And having that lucky start didn’t stand me in good stead when I began to receive rejection after rejection for my next set of manuscripts. Over time it all evens out, but that can mean long periods of rejection after rejection (people are often surprised at how many times a fair coin can turn up heads, if you toss it long enough). That can be pretty tough to handle, especially if you are early in your career, when each publication really counts, and you need them now - not later.

My next point is that there is never a comment from a referee that is not worth thinking seriously about. I mean that. Never ever. So what if they just skimmed your argument? So what if they clearly don’t know the literature as well as you do? So what if they hold to a shoddy interpretation of Hume or Foucault or whoever? It still matters what they thought. When your manuscript finally does get published, it will be read by people who just skim it, who don’t know the literature, and have dubious understandings of Hume and Foucault. You need to consider those readers as well – are there some small changes you can make so as to make your main point sensible to these readers? Could you make the abstract clearer – so that even the laziest scholar will not misunderstand what you are aiming to do in the paper? The point here isn’t to try and please everyone – that’s impossible. The point, rather, is never to write off a reviewer’s comments merely because you are sure they are an idiot. Often, they will still have said something that is worth thinking about seriously. It usually will cost you between two and six months to get those few comments; value them accordingly.

(The point about the abstract is worth emphasis too. I often fall into the trap of getting the paper itself very well-polished, and then realise I need the abstract only when I am about to submit, and just whip something up quickly. This is a mistake. The abstract is crucial. Every word in it matters. It will be the first thing editors and reviewers read – and the first thing scholars generally read when your article is published. You have to get it exactly right.)

Next point: always take the revise-and-resubmit process really seriously. A ‘revise and resubmit’ result should be what you are aiming for when you submit a manuscript. Most good journals will almost never give a straightforward acceptance. And a ‘revise and resubmit’ is usually an opportunity to really improve your paper. The comments you have been given are provided by someone who is clearly sympathetic to what you are doing (otherwise it would have been rejected). This is often the single best source of constructive criticism a scholar can access. Referees and editors will usually not require that you have made every change requested. What they will require, at absolute minimum, is that you have thought very carefully and sympathetically about their comments, and how they might benefit the paper. You don’t need just to do this – you need to demonstrate unequivocally to them that you have done it. (I’ll often provide a document detailing all the changes and my reasons, even if this is not requested.)

One final point: always always always be polite when dealing with journals, even if you feel you have been hard done by. There is nothing to be gained by telling the editor how incompetent one of her referees is, or that she should at least have sent it out for review, or whatever. Editing a journal is hard and often thankless work. The editor cannot second-guess her referees, or her own judgment, or her task becomes impossible. Moreover, venting your frustrations on the editor is a waste of emotional energy that would be better channelled into thinking seriously about whether and how to rework the manuscript. 

Take the criticism to your typewriter, as the old writing adage goes.

Tuesday, August 28, 2012

Conservative arguments for Gay Marriage: Marriage is too important to be left to the prudes


It’s widely believed that conservatives are and should be opposed to gay marriage. I’d like to argue the opposite. While it is rarely either fashionable or politically correct, conservatism is a respectable political standpoint that emphasizes the importance of tradition, institution, virtue, stability, family, local ways of life, and a community’s moral fabric (see my earlier blogpost: http://hughbreakey.blogspot.com.au/2012/08/the-meanings-of-conservatism.html). But like every political theory, it can be used as a rhetorical device for people pursuing other goals entirely. I argue that gay marriage is a site where the conservative should take a principled stand against the prude. I survey what I take to be the three main arguments as to why the conservative might wish to prohibit gay marriage, and I aim to show that – far from supporting such a stance – the conservative has powerful reason to pursue the reverse course. Conservatives need to start taking marriage seriously.

Preliminaries
What follows is a conservative argument; it takes as its basis the sorts of considerations that conservatism as a political theory takes seriously. It is not, however, a religious argument – religion will be relevant to what follows inasmuch as religion shapes the traditions and moral fabric of a society, but no further. I won’t pretend to answer questions purely of religious doctrine. (Though, since I speak to a predominantly Christian society, it is perhaps worth at least noting that I am unaware of Jesus saying anything whatsoever about homosexuality, and that no-one – at least, no-one who has a daughter – could possibly be convinced to take on board the morality relayed in the tale of Sodom.)

At the outset, the ‘liberal’ or justice-based reasons for allowing gay marriage are straightforward enough. That is, the law should treat all people equally, and a liberal society should not dictate what forms of life its citizens choose to pursue. When it comes to questions of the good life, the liberal state should be ‘neutral’ amongst all of the different lifestyle conceptions.

A conservative, it goes without saying, will hardly be impressed by such claims. Particularly in the context of marriage. In such a case we are not talking in terms of criminalization and toleration. No-one is demanding that homosexuality be outlawed, which many conservatives would acknowledge to be an unacceptable violation of individual liberty. Instead, the debate is only in terms of what should be recognized, encouraged or valued in a community. That is where the dispute lies in this question. And surely, the conservative will say, here, at least, there can be no question of liberal ‘neutrality’. If the liberal wishes to outlaw all marriage, and allow only civil union (if that?) to have legal recognition, then they may with consistency lobby for such a policy. But what the liberal cannot do is to accept the prerogative of society to uphold and value certain relationships (like those anointed with marriage) and then complain of its non-neutrality in making that valuation. Of course such a valuation is non-neutral – that is just what it means to evaluate.

Argument 1: Prizing what is going right. Gay marriage does not pay due respect to traditions (in this case marriage) that are functioning and important to the society
One of the basic conservative insights is that ‘critique’ has no privileged place in political discourse. In other words, criticism of society is not any more important than singing its praises. Thinking that the society that guides you or the authority that constrains you is doing something wrong is no remarkable intellectual feat (every two-year-old instinctually does this countless times every day when they don’t get their own way). To the contrary, understanding and respecting what a society does right is at least as important as reflecting on what it does wrong. With this in mind, the conservative may worry that gay marriage pays insufficient attention to what is going right in our society – namely, the (mostly-)functioning institution of marriage. In particular, it might be a concern that the reform wants to remake an institution – marriage – that is, for all its problems, still a profound source of meaning and security in our modern world.

I mention this point only to reject it. The proposed reform does prize what society is doing right. The argument for the reform is that marriage remains, for many, a valuable and fulfilling institution, and that the stamp of social approval on a commitment between two loving people is a desirable thing. That seems to me the best press marriage has had since divorce rates were first publicized. Indeed, one could imagine that the conservative could feel quietly vindicated about the desires of gays to be married. That gay people wish to be married is an endorsement of many deeply held conservative beliefs. Radicals for many years now have been predicting and advocating the demise of the ‘bourgeois’ institution of marriage and the family. That a group of people systematically excluded from the institution feel a desire not to spurn it, but rather to be included within it, is – it seems to me – an emphatic rejection of the radical and anti-conservative stance. It underscores that committed, stable, long-term loving relations between partners is indeed a deep need and value in many human lives, and, all the more, that the social sanction, recognition and approval of such relationships by the community is more relevant than ever. Both these points are exactly what conservatives believe and are straightforward rebuttals of radical predictions.

Argument 2: Gay Marriage is not socially valuable as it does not contribute to childbirth and child-rearing.
Marriage can be viewed as a socially valued institution because it is a necessary condition for propagating children and effective child-rearing. Both of these are legitimate concerns of the conservative, since they both carry plain implications for the survival of the society. On such a basis it might be argued that, as gay marriage does not contribute to this valuable social outcome, it is not therefore worthy of the same social and legal recognition.

Ethicist Professor Stephen Cohen (UNSW) recently responded to such arguments with a ‘shame on you’ accusation, suggesting that proponents of this view are advancing it only to cover up their real concern, which is with what they perceive as the immorality of homosexuality (which will be covered in the following section). He may well be right, but I will here take it as an argument on its face worth consideration by the conservative.

It is often responded to this argument that marriage is not centrally organized around propagation and child-rearing. Married couples are not required or even necessarily encouraged to have children. Marriage vows usually contain no declaration of intentions to raise children; often children are not mentioned at all. Persons who have no physical capacity to have children can be married. Persons who have no intention of having children – who are explicit in rejecting any such intention – can be married. Contraceptive methods of all types are available to married persons. Persons who have deliberately removed their capacity to have children (such as through a vasectomy) can be married. Indeed, the point here is not only that they can be married, but that there is no sense in which they are not socially perceived as being genuinely married. No one is attempting to deny them this status. It is not held, for instance, that if Amy and Bob really took their marriage seriously, they would have children, and that until they do, they are really just enacting a sort of ersatz version of marriage.

There is a conservative response to all this. The point might be made that social approval and recognition of stable, long-term, loving relationships between men and women in general is worthwhile, so that those that do go on to have children are more likely to have such relationships. In other words, it is easier to support and value the broad type of relationship in question than just to target the instances where that relationship is really socially valuable (viz. when it includes child-rearing).

Now this response is plausible enough, so far as it goes. The problem is only in thinking that this is any sort of reason not to allow gay marriage. The entire response is founded on the idea that it may be worth socially encouraging a type of relationship in general so that it can be assured in the subset of cases where it really matters for the community (when children are involved). If that is right, however, then it is obvious that gay marriage is worth approval for just the same reason that heterosexual-marriage-without-children is. Namely, in order to emphasize to everyone in society the value of the committed, long-term loving relationship between two partners.

Two further points are worth noting, in this regard. First, if marriage really is a bulwark to child-rearing, then gay marriage matters because gay couples can – of course – have children. They can adopt or foster children, and lesbian couples with access to sperm donors can also have children. A bisexual person may have had a child in a previous relationship, but now be in a gay relationship. And so on. Prohibiting gay marriage in all such instances would amount to a society deliberately prohibiting a child from being reared under the aegis of the institution which (the conservative response believes) is fundamentally designed for that purpose. A secure and stable home life suitable for rearing children does not depend upon a heterosexual couple being in residence; the crucial thing is the security and stability itself.

The second point is that it is highly doubtful that the only reason the conservative values marriage is because of its consequences for children. Marriage is often held by conservatives to be the central glue that holds a society together, and this is because it forms a strong, stabilizing part of a larger web of social relations. Similar to but more potent than friendship, marriage cements, so far as possible, parts of the social fabric together. Furthermore, it encourages socially useful traits like prudence, investment, temperance, sacrifice, loyalty, trustworthiness and productivity. So too the institution plays a role in the understanding of other social relations: aunts, uncles, sons, daughters, brothers- and sisters-in-law, and so on. Married people are for the conservative not valuable simply as breeders. And if this is right, then the conservative reasons for valuing and promoting marriage apply with equal force to gays as much as heterosexuals.

Argument 3:  Including gays into the institution of marriage will weaken the sanctity of that institution.
Granting that the desire of gays to be married is good news for the institution of marriage (as concluded in Argument 1), it may yet be argued that allowing their inclusion could weaken the power and significance of that institution. The thought here is based on the view that many people view homosexuality as immoral, disquieting and/or disgusting. Now it may be in some sense unfortunate or even bigoted that many people think this way, but that judgement does not prevent it from being a fact that they do. And if many people do indeed hold those views, then their perception of the sanctity and specialness of marriage can only be undermined when it henceforth includes gays within its compass. Some of the meaning of marriage will have been eroded, and that is a concern for the conservative.

But which of marriage’s meanings are we upholding? Doubtless there is a tradition, or part of a tradition, that celebrates a man and a women specifically committing to each other; that is, it matters that it is a man and a woman.

But there is another tradition, or another part of the marriage tradition, that holds that what is special is the love itself, the commitment itself. It holds that these elements are what are being picked out as worthy parts of a life well-lived, and an important part of the social glue that holds us all together. Now if that is right, then the question of gay marriage asks us to choose which parts of the marriage tradition are important. Because if it is the lifelong love or commitment (or at least the noble and determined attempt at pursuing these) that is worthwhile and valuable, then we cannot pretend that they are not worthwhile and valuable wherever we may find them.

Here’s an analogy: It would be like a person at a football match needing to check the skin-colour of the player who took a specky to determine whether it really was a great mark, or not. Put aside the racism of such a person; that’s not the issue here. The issue is that the person doesn’t get footy. They don’t understand – they are blind to – the values internal to the sport. They are unable to apprehend the act according to the standards of the marking contest as set down by the sport’s tradition and practice: bravery, altitude, strength, skill, quality-of-opposition, stakes and so on. And if a sporting body did believe that race mattered when it came to such questions, it would be defying the internal values of the sporting tradition. In other words, a conservative about the sport – a ‘custodian of the game’ as Don Bradman aptly expressed it in the context of cricket – would have every reason to be horrified by such a distortion of the standards of excellence of the sport, by the infection of the tradition with standards imported from outside its practice.

So too, I submit, for marriage. For all those who value the institution’s eulogizing of steadfast love and commitment, through thick and thin, as the guiding star of its tradition, the demand that gays be excluded from marriage can only diminish their respect for the institution, and cut against the perceived grain of its tradition. For now they are being told they got it wrong, and despite everything in all their vows about love and sacrifice through thick and thin, marriage wasn’t really about such things after all. The exclusion from gays from marriage was consonant with the internal values of marriage only when society held a variety of views on homosexuality – in particular that it was a form of insanity, and rightly illegalized – that implied that gays couldn’t really love and commit in the ways sanctified by marriage. Without the support of these now widely debunked myths, the internal values of marriage apply to gay partnerships as much as they apply to heterosexual ones.

The fundamental point here is that traditions are always contested and often conflicting, and the conservative needs to be aware (as Roger Scruton himself makes clear) that for this reason it is impossible to uphold every tradition at once. The conservative stands here at a crossroads, needing to decide which tradition of marriage will be upheld. The one that is responsive to a long-standing felt immorality of, or distaste for, homosexuality? Or the one that unreservedly makes central lifelong love and steadfast commitment? I submit that, when conceived on these grounds, no conservative can opt for the former. The latter picks out exactly the values and virtues of marriage that are prized by the conservative; it foregrounds the qualities that make it contribute to the moral fabric and ongoing resilience of the community. To believe that a dislike of gays is sufficient to warrant their exclusion from the institution of marriage is not to take seriously the worth of marriage.

The same point, too, can be made with respect to religion. (Now I’m not religious myself, so I’m drawing here on Rev. Noel Preston’s illuminating thoughts on the issue here: http://www.journeyonline.com.au/showArticle.php?articleId=3368) There is an important part of the marriage tradition that values and celebrates a couple coming together with God, deciding to intertwine their lives together and with their Maker. Now if that decision and commitment is what is valuable (either in terms of a life-well-lived, or for the life of the community), then that is a reason to respect it wherever it is found. This is not to say that every religion needs to marry homosexuals; that is of course a question of religious doctrine. But the question here is the one confronting the conservative, weighing up what traditions to sustain in cases where they must choose.  As before, it is the noble and uplifting elements of marriage – love, commitment, holiness – that are on the side of the institution as it might be enlarged to include gays. And it is a quite different set of elements and traditions being invoked by those who would prohibit it. The traditions clash, and the conservative must choose which will triumph at the expense of the other.

But for the genuine conservative, there is no choice whatsoever here. A marriage tradition that downplays the values and virtues of lifelong love, companionship, stability and steadfast commitment as they rank in comparison to the gender of the participants is no marriage tradition at all. It splices from the tradition exactly the values and virtues that make it precious from a conservative standpoint.

                                                         *                      *                      *
The foregoing arguments combine to make a simple point. Conservatism – or, at least, conservatism as a political theory, with its focus on tradition, virtue, moral fabric and the survival of the society – is not the same thing as prudishness. The prude believes that what everyone else does sexually is the prude’s business. The prude wants to know what is being done by others, and wants to control what is being done by others. But there is no political theory of prudishness. No-one pretends that one person’s salacious desire for prying and intruding into other people’s sexuality constitutes any reason that society should cave in to that desire. So the prude presents their desires as if they were grounded conservative arguments. They are like the drunk who searches for his lost keys under the streetlamp, not because there is a good chance they are there, but because it is the only place he is likely to find them. The prude cannot pretend they have justice or liberty on their side; traditions of human rights don’t accept the law intruding into such private matters and lifestyles. Conservatism, however, does allow that such private acts can fall within the appropriate scope of law, and certainly of rightful public opinion and sanction. So the attempt is made by the prude to colonize the conservative stance. But to say that the conservative agrees that sexual and other ‘private’ matters are fair game for social concern is not the same as saying those matters must be constrained in whatever way the prude desires. For there are many traditions at work in any functioning society, not only prudish ones. And some of those traditions, such as the values internal to the institution of marriage – steadfast love and lifelong commitment – are not ones with which the conservative should wish to trifle.

Ultimately, the conservative throughout history has known that it is the internal enemies that are the most dangerous. If what I have argued here is right, conservatives must remember that their concerns and goals are not the same as those of the prude, and they must be ready, when necessary, to battle the enemy that seeks to infiltrate their ranks and speak in their name. This, I think, is the serious point behind the popular tweet by Morgan Freeman: ‘I hate the word homophobia. It’s not a phobia. You are not scared. You are an asshole.’ In other words, the charge here, another version of Cohen’s shame-on-you, is: ‘You’re not a conservative and you should stop pretending you are. You are not animated by genuine fears for social values and traditions. You are a prude (or maybe you just have a taste for institutionalized meanness). You are just one more person who thinks society should be structured to conform to your every prejudice, with no serious thought whatsoever of what that might do or mean for our society and its institutions.’

One final point in closing. Sometimes the ‘argument’ given for gay marriage is just given as: ‘C’mon, its 2012! Why are we still arguing about this?’ On its face, this can seem mere assertion, and can present social change as being inevitable progress against the embarrassing bigotries of history. Such a position may seem to be something the conservative will rightly want to guard against. But it is worth remembering that traditions and practices are not museum pieces. Some cultural practices are journeys; they have their own internal momentum (consider the archetype of conservative social practice: the common law).  The blithe assertion that it is 2012 is, in its way, an appeal to our society’s traditions – some of them centuries old. It says that we are still continuing on the journey our ancestors set us upon; that they bequeathed to us unfinished business that we have been lax in attending to.

It’s 2012, and it’s high time we started taking the tradition of marriage seriously. It is too important to be left to the prudes.

Sunday, August 19, 2012

The Meanings of Conservatism


Why is conservatism worth trying to understand?

For several reasons. First, conservatism is a genuine political force in many elections; many of the arguments that follow play a real role in many people’s thinking about politics, especially on certain issues. So too legislators and judges are always sensitive to the disruption of institutions and established expectations that can be effected by new laws and new interpretations of law. So it is worth understanding, even if only to be able to argue effectively against it.

Second, conservatism is often given a pretty short shrift in political philosophy, in the sense that is rarely engaged with seriously. For example, many lecturers in political philosophy courses don’t deal with it at all (yep, guilty as charged); and there is no entry on it in either the –otherwise excellent – Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy or the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Conservatism flies under the philosophical radar, and that’s an interesting fact in itself.

Third, while conservatism isn’t philosophically popular, communitarianism is. Like communitarianism, conservatism deals in tradition, practice, social identity, story and forms of life. But conservatism, it seems to me, is what communitarianism looks like when you’re not surveying it from the outside looking in, as if at an object in a museum, but when you’re on the inside, living it, breathing it and keeping it alive. And that is an important perspective to illuminate in political theory.

Fourth, conservatism isn’t just one particular standpoint; it brings together an array of arguments and beliefs, and it is possible to think that some, but not others, are sound. So a counter-argument to or rejection of one of the arguments offered below does not necessarily imply the defeat or irrelevance of any of the others.

A couple of preliminaries: First, from the outset I’m not dealing with the religious aspect of conservatism, though of course religion can form a major aspect of the institutions, practices and traditions that I go on to talk about. But it is the commitment to tradition and institution per se that is the focus here; and not on the role of religion (which can, of course, be as reformist as conservative).

Second, I have scant credentials as a conservative myself; I am by temper more Thomas Paine than Edmund Burke; more Amartya Sen than Roger Scruton. But I have sympathies with many of the conservative arguments that follow, even if I rarely find them decisive. My purpose here, in any case, is not to critique these arguments, but to set them forward as sensibly and reasonably as I can. Doubtless though, the arguments I tend to glean from the conservative canon are the ones I think are worth bothering with, so I make no claims of comprehensiveness. And do keep in mind that I’m not at all engaging with counterarguments here. Even though I think several of the points below are correct so far as they go, they are still vulnerable to powerful countervailing considerations.

Third, the main literary resource for what follows is Roger Scruton’s The Meaning of Conservatism (but as I think there are a multitude of arguments by and for conservatism, I have used the plural ‘conservatisms’ in my title). Edmund Burke plays a role too, of course, and I incorporate some communitarian points in what follows. But some of the following arguments are rarely made very explicit, and others are just more or less common-sense arguments for caution in policy-change from political theory generally. Finally, some (such as the brief discussion on adaptive preferences below) are probably more a product of my own thought than settled conservative doctrine.

Without further ado, eight arguments for conservatism in politics.

1. Conservatism as upholding established expectations
The most obvious point comes in first. People plan their lives and fashion their actions and choices to their expectations – especially their expectations about government policy and law. This is particularly true of long-term projects involving prudence, productivity and investment. Because such long-term planning is important for individuals, and very often desirable from a social and economic point of view, it is important to try to disrupt those expectations as little as possible. (Of course, this is not to say that no new policy is possible, and businesses have been known to try cleaving to expectations in the hope that they will then be substantiated by policy.) Disrupting expectations unsettles people’s current projects, renders pointless many actions they have taken on the basis of those expectations, and chills their enthusiasm for future long-term projects that may be similarly disrupted. In sum, ‘suddenly’ is a bad word in politics.

Expectations are also important in the context of adaptive preferences. Adaptive preferences occur when people constrain their preferences to the reality of their situation; we learn to stop wishing (really wishing, that is; fantasizing is probably fine) to be a prince, queen, rockstar, supermodel or dictator-for-life. While adaptive preferences have come under some fire in recent times, the thought that the best route to happiness and independence is to fashion your desires to no more than you can potentially achieve is an ancient and perennial one, and runs from the Stoics and Epicureans to John Stuart Mill (as I argue in the AJPAE 2010, if you’re interested in the ideas mentioned here). Happiness resides in enjoying the journey and taking pride in your decisions, not in making the world your oyster. If this is right, and adaptive preferences are indeed a key way for humans to pursue their own happiness, then establishing firm expectations for a citizenry, and then upholding those expectations against disruption and upheaval, is arguably a legitimate task for the state.

2. Conservatism as prizing what is going right
One might think that this too is an obvious enough point. Every society does at least some things right, and it is not an automatic feature of any given group of people that it gets those things (even very basic things) right. For example, if a society looks after its member’s rights adequately, tolerates minorities, or has peaceable relations with its neighbours, then those are features of its existence that are valuable. As such, they must be known and prized; without such a reckoning, ideas for reform or even revolution are reckless. In pursuing some other reform, we may in fact undermine the much more crucial and fundamental goods our society is providing.

Now I said above that one would think that this point is obvious enough – it is little more than the sensible advice that we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater. Understanding and appreciating what a society does right is at least as important as grasping its shortcomings. But it seems to me this point is not as widely appreciated as one might think. ‘Critique’ seems to occupy a privileged place in political and philosophical discourse; it is as if the person who judges their political environment as faulty has somehow achieved something important and remarkable as compared with the person who thinks things are going okay. But much as everyone may love to style themselves a Socratic gadfly, stinging people out of their dogmatic slumbers, the fact is that prioritizing self-critique over self-praise risks making the best the enemy of the good.

Here’s an example: a recent survey in my country, Australia, found that a little over 10% of the population harbour racist views. Which is more significant? That more than 10% of people in a society are racist, or that almost 90% are not? The conservative will worry that the blazing headlines saying ‘Australia is racist!’ misplace the achievement of a society that is reaching towards 90% non-racism (and, all the more, that such headlines give solace and support to the 10%, who are given the misleading impression they are part of a silent majority, rather than an embarrassing few).

Of course, an important factor in making these sorts of appraisals will be what the person thinks is likely to happen in the absence of society in general, and this society in particular. If outside of society, and in other different societies, people are very likely to (say) respect others’ rights, work productively, trust and be trusted, be peaceful and rational in their dealings with others, and not be racist and sexist, then if a society has (to some significant extent) all these features, then they cannot really be viewed as achievements of the society in question. If, on the other hand, the natural state of humans when bundled together in high numbers with scarce resources is not to display these felicitous qualities, then the society would indeed have features that are to be treasured and nurtured. So whether we cleave to a Lockean or Hobbesian state of nature, whether we believe in the noble savage or the Lord of the Flies, determines the touchstone we apply to our own society and its achievements.

Thus, taking again the racism survey as an example, if most societies in the contemporary context are, say, 2% racist and 98% non-racist, then it is not an achievement – it is in fact an embarrassment – to be on 10/90%. If the entire society were to be remodelled, then this would be one feature of the society we would be happy to consign to the dustbin of history. Conversely though, if the proportion elsewhere is more like 30/70% (this is the figure the survey’s authors put on comparative studies on racism in Europe, for example), then it is something to be treasured and celebrated that a society would be pushing toward 90%.

3. Conservatism as the salience of the status quo
One reason for leaving policy or a law as it lies is quite simple: to avoid the enormous social waste on squabbling, lobbying and politicking about where the boundary should be redrawn (and then redrawn again in the next election). There are all sorts of different political theories that make all sorts of different recommendations on any given policy issue. When there is genuine division within a community over the proper placement of a policy or tax, it can sometimes seem common-sense (except in cases of obvious injustice and manifest disutility) to simply leave it where it lies. The initial policy may have been arbitrary, but it can seem a more ‘neutral’, and so acceptable, position than re-figuring the policy in the favour of one side or other of the political divide.

An example where almost everyone will agree there is at least something to be said for this policy is, I think, is in the context of national boundaries. National boundaries are often poorly drawn on a variety of dimensions (especially when they are remnants of colonialist ventures, such as in Africa or the Subcontinent). But it can seem much sounder policy not to even open the question of how they could be better drawn, with all of the fractious and divisive emotions – and the ever-present threat of devastating internecine violence and ethnic cleansing – that will erupt as soon as the question is thrown open to dispute.

4. Conservatism as the social fabric determining the law
Moving into more controversial terrain, the thought here is that the law as written in statutes and legal constitutions is not enough to understand the law as it is enacted in practice. Judges and juries, and the community as a whole, interpret the law from their own lived experience of a form of life, their understanding of the history of the community, and their stance on what is and what is not appropriate behaviour. What counts as breach of contract, negligence, trespass, and harm are informed and shaped by the community stance and its history, just as much as what counts as giving offence, indecency, nuisance, and blasphemy. The social meaning given to all of these normative concepts is filled out by the community’s shared morality. Parliaments may pass whatever legislation they care to – but it will always be obeyed, interpreted and applied in a way that accords with community feelings about appropriate behaviour. And if it cannot be interpreted in that way, then the law will fail, one way or another. One cannot impose on a community laws that do not comport with its understandings about what is right and wrong, fit and unfit, and helpful and harmful to the society. The written law is simply not determinate or powerful enough to impose itself against the moral fabric. 

One can see elements of this wisdom in, for example, UN ‘community-based’ efforts to increase women’s rights. The received wisdom is now that one must use the people (including men), roles, institutions and traditions in the community in order to effect meaningful change. The point is to empower the elements within the society that wish to elevate women’s standing, and to persuade and educate the other elements, rather than to rest one’s case on state or international law, which cannot be effective without change in community mindsets.

5. Conservatism as the social fabric that holds the society together.
The argument here is that the fact that a society’s people are bound by legality is not enough to have a functioning, secure society, capable of sustaining itself against threats, pressures and the ravages of time. A society in the full sense of the world requires a level of shared values, shared ideas about justice and desert, and perhaps even about politeness, recognition, neighbourliness, respect, offensiveness, toleration, selfishness, treatment of children, marriage and courting, bribery and nepotism, and so on. These shared ideas are what make social life run smoothly, with less enmity and clashes between factions. A society abiding by the law only through the threat of the law’s force, and not a commitment to the values at work in those laws and to the legitimacy of the reigning legal authority, is no society at all. Likewise a ‘society’ where each part believes the other to be acting wrongfully and offensively, violating their proper rights, unable to be trusted in business, politics, religion or friendship, and awaiting only a growth in raw power to seize control of the state is no society at all. It is at best an unstable modus vivendi; at worst a bastard patchwork of disparate parts waiting only a flashpoint to spark the fires of hatred. Mere law and its force, in sum, do not constitute and cannot sustain a community; at least some level of shared moral perspective is required.

5a. Conservatism as Moralism
Because law is not enough to hold a society together in peace and mutual tolerance, there is a strong reason for law and political institutions being used to promote – or at least to facilitate –virtue. Law and institutions should be moralistic on this account; they should be shaped so that they help create virtuous persons. Institutions dealing with children are crucial in this regard; the next generation needs to be socialized into the sense of justice and respect for others that are required for the society (and the law in that society) to survive and flourish.

One particular aspect of this line of thought is to consider, when faced with a policy, not the question, ‘What good will this law create?’ but rather, ‘How will this law shift people’s motivations? What relationships will this law motivate and make possible? Will this law encourage people to be good, hardworking and trustworthy (say), or the reverse?’

6. Conservatism as the wisdom of practice, not ideas
Perhaps the most interesting contribution of conservatism, from a political-philosophic perspective, is the idea that wisdom can be found in action and practice that is not visible (and, perhaps, cannot even be made visible) by theory, discourse, or written law. The thought here is that sometimes people manage to work out solutions to problems without any over-arching policy discussion, theorizing, or determined implementation. Over time, people’s actions that were initially, perhaps, disruptive of others’ projects come to be integrated into the local way of life; implicitly and with no top-down ordering, people manage to get along, and work out ways of getting things done with others and alongside others.

A popular example might be the development of the common law. A more concrete example (and one with which I am more familiar) is in property arrangements, where local groups can over time develop highly sophisticated systems for managing commons and open-pool resources that are often disrupted (with bad results for both the local communities and the environment) when central governments try to take over running such resources with their rules, police and top-down policy. On this footing, too much theorizing, justifying and rationalizing over politics can be a very bad thing; it can struggle to notice, understand or bring to light the vast complexities of social relations that have been workably harmonized by - on the one hand - practice, trial-and-error and perhaps an instinctual, decentralized sense of justice and non-interference, and - on the other - by spontaneous, unplanned action. Unable to comprehend such myriad and involute complexities and relations, and their fittingness for local circumstances, political theory tramples straight over them. It derives its policy from a logical application of a laughably tiny handful of moral axioms, and is perplexed when its legal instantiation falters or elicits disastrous consequences.

Sometimes too, a decent result can arise from a balance of two separate powers, either of which on its own would be harmful. In such a case, ‘reform’ (and so constraint) of one side can be catastrophic, as it hands victory to the opposing force.

The image of society as an organism is often put forward by conservatives, but perhaps a better figure is one of ecology. In many respects, a human society behaves a lot like an ecosystem, with thousands of tiny inter-connections and relations, and a balance of powers creating equilibrium. (In this respect, it is worth noting that Aldo Leopold, the father of modern conservationism, argued for respect for ecologies by analogy to the features they shared with societies. Despotism and instrumental control, Leopold argued, are wrong and unworkable for the same reason in application to the environment as they are in application to human communities.) In ecology, policy-makers are now largely aware how difficult it is to do ‘just one thing’. Making one change in a complex and chaotic environment might achieve the desired end, but it may do so at the cost of disrupting countless other crucial symbioses, equilibriums and food chains. Just as in an ecosystem, in society one law that is intended to have a single, simple, determinate benefit can wind up shifting motivations, payoffs, balance-of-powers and myriad other factors to create serious problems elsewhere. Aid economies are a startling and pressing example of this point.

Ultimately – and it is a challenge to a very basic tenet of much political philosophy – the worry is that political theory is just too darn uncomplicated, too reductive and simplistic, to make sense of the historic and lived reality of the gloriously messy and complicated human animal and the types of social interactions they can construct.

7. Conservatism as patriotism
Conservatism supports the creation of a community to which a person can feel they belong, and which shapes what they understand as their identity. One cannot understand the ‘I’ a given person conceives without reference to the society in which they form (and see themselves as forming) one proper part. Equally, the society is a means allowing members to express their shared identity. Its laws, shared practices and institutions announce the presence of the member’s identity in the community to itself and the world.

This type of community acquires loyalty and patriotic feeling, which is a key fillip to moral action regarding one’s neighbours and compatriots (though, of course, moral action towards foreigners is a separate question). Self-love is expanded out by this feeling of community, as members increasingly identify with their compatriots, and – indeed – with their community as a whole, taking pride in its successes and feeling harms against it as harms against their own persons. In this way the member starts to consider and care for those practices and institutions that preserve and empower the life of the society. A healthy community is a viable entity; it contains resources, traditions, powers, practices and processes that ensure its preservation over time, and it is these that are the focus of the patriot’s care. (Of course, not everything that falls under the banner of ‘patriotism’ counts here. For example, as well as having the type of patriotism valued by the conservative, in my country of Australia there is also a rival brand of ‘patriotism’ that, so far as I can perceive, celebrates quasi-lawless, quasi-violent, anti-authoritarianism. It goes without saying that this is almost opposite to the type of committed loyalty envisaged by the conservative.)

8. Conservatism as tradition
There are a variety of ways of formulating the idea of tradition. Indeed, ‘tradition’ may be difficult to fully capture in words because there is a sense in which it transcends thought and language. One way is in terms of (what Macintyre calls) the internal goods of a practice. Communities over time develop practices that have their own internal pleasures, joys and standards, and have their own types of excellences to be pursued. Chess, sports, dances, intellectual pursuits, music, art and even politics itself can all offer profound gifts to those who become part of these traditions. On this footing, the valuable and attractive parts of a tradition are the internal pleasures and excellences that it affords those within it, who are thus motivated to protect it as a valuable and worthwhile form of life.

Another (sometimes inter-related) way of speaking of tradition focuses on the importance of the past practices that have a long local history. A child is born into such practices, coming to play a role perceived as being time-honoured, incorporating them to a past-but-still-living community and its way of being, and giving them a way of carrying on the journey and projects of their ancestors. Unlike a (Macintyrean) practice, there may be no internal goods in the sense of excellences and standards in these activities. In this case the history alone makes the activity worthwhile and meaningful – the history alone is what makes the act transcend its own limitations and become part of a story that began long before the actor was alive, and will continue long after the actor is dead. To take part in that story by carrying on the community's traditions, is to take part in the larger journey and form of life.

                                    *                                    *                             *

Those are, as I see it, the premier eight reasons for being conservative. (Recall again that we have not considered objections or countervailing arguments, so nothing said here is intended to be taken as proven or decisive, though I hope that I have managed to suggest there is some wisdom and sense, at least, in each of the arguments.)

In the next few weeks, I hope to consider a few topics from the standpoint of conservatism, including gay marriage and immigration.